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ABSTRACT  
The world’s leading environmental advisory institutions look to ecological theory and research as an 
objective guide for policy and resource management decision-making.  In addition to the theoretical 
and broadly philosophical merits of doing so, it is therefore practically significant to clear up 
confusions about ecology’s conceptual foundations and to clarify the basic workings of inferential 
methods used in the science.  Through discussion of key moments in the genesis of the theoretical 
branch of ecology, this essay elucidates a general heuristic role of teleological metaphors in 
ecological research and defuses certain enduring confusions about work in ecology.  
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As ecology is the science of  complex biophysical dynamics directly relevant to environmental policy 
and resource management decision-making, advisory institutions around the world have increasingly 
emphasized the guiding role the science should play in such decision-making.  Indeed, ecology is 
now seen as an objective guide for “urgent political, ethical, and management decisions about how 
best to live in an apparently increasingly-fragile environment” (Colyvan et al, 2009, p. 1). 
 This is reflected in countlessly many regional, national, and international directives and 
pieces of  legislation that call to protect ecological entities (e.g. ecosystems), their functionality (e.g. 
stability), and properties (e.g. biodiversity) (Donhauser, forthcoming).  For example, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), European Union, and National Resources Canada each 
emphasize ‘long-term sustainability of  ecosystem’s structure and functioning’ as an overarching 
guide for all policy and management strategy decision-making (cf. Apitz et al, 2006; McAfee & 
Malouin ed., 2008; McFadden & Barnes, 2009; McGinty et al, 1995).  And one finds many explicit 
normative claims about ecological entities in the expanding literature on mitigating losses of  human 
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goods (e.g., agricultural species and human health benefits) due to climate change (see Donhauser, 
forthcoming).  For instance, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2013 
analysis of  non-economic losses lists loss of  “ecosystems,” “ecosystem services” (goods dependent 
on the ecosystem functionality), and “biodiversity” (an ecosystem property), as the “main types of  
non-economic losses” that will be experienced due to climate change (UNFCCC, 2013, p. 4). 
Explicit claims that environmental policy-makers and resource managers should consult 
ecological theory as an objective guide for decision-making are also easy to find.  For example, the 
EPA’s general resource management guidelines emphatically state that efforts to protect any 
particular natural ecosystem should be guided by “the latest scientific understanding of the inherent 
properties (i.e., patterns and processes) of that ecosystem type” (2002, p. 78).  Leading ecologists 
even straightforwardly promise that ecological theory can serve as “a strong guide for environmental 
management and resource conservation” (Jørgensen, 2006, p. 21). 
At the same time, critics of ecology-guided policy continue to contend that such promises 
ring empty and warn that advisory organizations have been foolhardy to embrace ecological theory 
as a guide for decision-making—on the grounds that the science has shaky philosophical 
foundations (see Sagoff 2013 for recent arguments).  Many have questioned whether the entities 
described in ecological theory exist in any meaningful sense at all (see Jordan, 1981; Sagoff, 1997; 
Shizas & Stamous, 2010; Sterelny, 2001; Wittbecker, 1990).1  And numerous authors have argued 
that theoretical ecological research is empirically unfounded (even empirically unfoundable), and 
contend that directives advising one to look to it for guidance in policy and management decision-
making are therefore deeply problematic (cf. Hall 1988; Haskell 1940; Peters 1991; Sagoff 2003; 
Sagoff 2013). 
                                                          
1 I am sympathetic to the view that many concepts employed in ecology (e.g. ‘ecosystem’ and ‘community’) can, and 
arguably do, serve as useful and practically valuable theoretical constructs even if they haven’t any naturally delineated 
analogues; cf. Fitzsimmons, 1999 and O’Neill, 2001. 
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Of course, ecology’s critics are right that it is advisable to recognize the limitations of 
theories and research methods employed in the science.  To best understand those limitations and 
how ecological research may be useful for practical decision-making despite them, it is also crucial to 
clear up confusions about ecology’s conceptual foundations and to clear away misguided critiques 
that engage such confusions.  Numerous philosophers and ecologists have attempted to flesh out a 
reasonable metaphysics and epistemology of ecology with the aims of:  
contributing to ecology itself  by working toward a unifying theoretical foundation;  
exploring the implications of  inferential methods used in ecology for philosophy of  science 
in general;  
better understanding potential applications of  research processes used by ecologists;  
and defending the science against misguided criticisms (see, for example, Cooper 2007; Eliot 
2011; McIntosh 1985; Odenbaugh 2011b, Reiners & Lockwood 2010). 
Many confusions about ecology’s philosophical foundations stem from the absence of  a 
straightforward narrative of  the genesis and evolution of  thinking in the science.  So, an approach 
that has been fruitful in philosophical work on ecology has been to show light on conceptual 
innovations that brought the science to its current form through analyses of  key research projects in 
its historical development (see Donhauser, 2014; de Laplante & Picasso 2011; Golley 1993, 
Odenbaugh 2007; Odenbaugh 2011a; Ulanowicz 1999).  This essay employs this jointly historical 
and analytic approach to clarify certain inferential methods used in modern ecology and clear away a 
class of  persisting confusions about the science’s conceptual foundations. 
In §1, I discuss major innovations in early ecologists’ thinking about the nature of  ecological 
entities that I contend mark the historical beginning of  modern ecology.  I then examine the role of  
teleological characterizations in modern ecology.  That is, characterizations of  ecological 
populations, communities, or systems, as ‘goal-directed’ or as ‘functioning toward some goal state.’  
In §2, I elucidate a general epistemic role of  such characterizations through discussion of  seminal 
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ecologist G. Evelyn Hutchinson’s paper “Circular Causal Systems in Ecology” (1948), which I place 
as the first, and in certain ways archetypal, theoretical research project in modern ecology.  I argue that 
Hutchinson (1948) does not use teleological characterizations of  ecological phenomena literally but 
as metaphors that aid in developing “mechanistic,” component-to-component, accounts of  the 
underlying causes of  observable ecological network-level dynamics.  I support this reading by 
offering an operational account of  the heuristic role teleological metaphors play in the reasoning 
process he employs in his landmark paper.  I contend, moreover, that ecologists have apparently 
followed Hutchinson, and typically use teleological characterizations as metaphors that play heuristic 
roles in advancing understanding of  the underlying mechanics of  ecological network-level 
phenomena. 
In §3, I then further defend my position and critically respond to opposing literalist 
construals of  teleological characterizations in ecology—including arguments according to which 
theoretical ecological research is unscientific, and allegedly of  no value for practical decision-making, 
because it is supposed to rely on teleological, “magical,” thinking (Sagoff, 2013, p. 248).  I support 
my contention that robust teleological views are not and have not been embraced as a mainstream 
convention within ecology since Hutchison (1948) at least, by pointing to textual evidence showing 
that ecologists have stayed on board with the idea that teleological characterizations are not literal 
but instrumentally useful metaphors.  I then show that ecologists can block claims that their 
functional accounts of  ecological phenomena rely on commitments to a robust teleology by 
outlining a deflationary, etiological and instrumentalist, view available to them.  In essence, in stark 
contrast to a teleological metaphysics that accepts “top-down” causality, the endorsed ‘etiological’ 
view sees teleological characterizations as shorthand ways of  describing the complex component-to-
component, “bottom-up” or “efficient,” causes of  ecological network-level properties. 
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1.  TIME-STAMPING THE BIRTH OF MODERN ECOLOGY 
While I cannot deny that some ecologists embrace robust teleological metaphysics, I will establish 
that this commitment is not relied on within modern theoretical ecology—as some authors would have one 
believe.  Since I will begin to establish this by discussing key moments in the historical genesis of  
modern ecology and the subfield theoretical ecology, it is sensible to begin by pinning down when 
modern ecology began.  As I understand the history of  ecology, modern ecology began when, in 
certain well-known works, ecologists traded ontologically robust ideas of  populations, communities, 
and ecosystems, for a more ontology-neutral view according to which ecological entities are 
contingent causal networks resulting from species-typical interactions between organisms and 
components of  their shared environment(s) (Donhauser, forthcoming). 
 Despite the fact that ecologists still use language that can easily elicit misinterpretations of  
their ontological commitments, the ecological literature shows that this more neutral view has been 
the received view for a long time.  Some authors argue that Karl August Möbius articulated this 
understanding of  ecological entities as contingent causal networks in the 1800s, and others argue 
that the view took root even earlier (see, for example, Shrader-Frechette & McCoy, 1993, p. 19; 
Egerton, 2012, Ch. 1).  I won’t make heavy work of  pinpointing the view’s exact origin or tracking 
its genesis, since I wish to simply demarcate when modern ecology began by establishing when it 
became a widely received view. 
 In my view, three specific articles published in the 1940s ushered in the wide-spread 
acceptance of  the salient network-based view, and stimulated the growth of  the theoretical branch 
of  ecology by demystifying the holistic (“top-down”) study of  populations, communities, and 
ecosystems.  These are Raymond Lindeman’s “The Trophic Dynamic Aspect of  Ecology” (1942), A. 
B. Novikoff ’s “The Concept of  Integrative Levels and Biology” (1945) and Hutchinson’s “Circular 
Causal Systems in Ecology” (1948).  I will now “time-stamp” the birth of  modern theoretical 
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ecology by outlining what Lindeman and Novikoff  did in each of  their papers to help usher in the 
modern era of  ecology and then explaining why I place Hutchinson’s paper as the first work in 
modern theoretical ecology. 
 In essence, Lindeman (1942) first explicitly described community and ecosystem-level 
dynamics as the product of  complex series of  ecological interactions—what he calls “physical-
chemical-biological processes”—in a paper published in a popular academic journal (cf. Golley, 
1993, Chaps. 3 and 4).2  So, Lindeman helped popularize the networked–based view simply by 
explicitly describing ecological entities as biophysical networks in his widely read and cited paper.  
Still, in my view, Lindeman did not do enough in the way of  articulating how community and 
ecosystem dynamics can be produced to count the work as having firmly established the network-
based view.  Lindeman (1942) does not explain in what the “physical-chemical-biological processes” 
that he claims produce network-level dynamics can consist, but only draws correlations between 
changes in environmental factors (e.g., global temperature and nutrient levels) and changes in the 
relative abundances of  monitored populations.  In fact, explaining how the complex processes that 
Lindeman describes can produce ecological network-level properties requires a more complete 
theory of  biochemistry than Lindeman and most ecologists at the time were working with. 
To describe the sorts of  causal interactions that can realize the “physical-chemical-biological 
processes” Lindeman claimed produce community and ecosystem-level dynamics, one must explain 
how trophic interactions, environmental factors, and network-level dynamics are causally related.  
                                                          
2 Some may complain that I have unfairly overlooked earlier works in which ecologists seem to discuss ecological 
phenomena in network-based terms.  For example, Elton (1927) and Tansley (1935) both discuss ecological 
communities and “systems” in terms of trophic interactions and “webs”; see Donhauser, forthcoming.  As an 
anticipatory response, I submit that substantive claims made in earlier works I know of are roughly the same as 
Lindeman’s, in that they are too vague to warrant concluding that their author’s understood ecological entities as natural 
causal networks in the way modern ecologists do.  I also think there is a reasonable case to be made that noteworthy 
ecologists working in the mid-1920s and 1930s (namely Elton and Tansley), embraced more thoroughgoing antirealist 
views.   More to the point of my overall argument, remember also that I am here concerned with outlining what was 
done in those works that effectively “ushered in the wide-spread acceptance of the salient network-based view”; and, in 
my view, earlier works just didn’t do this because the view was not generally accepted until later, in the 1940s and 50s.  
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Although George Verdanksy developed the central ideas of  biochemistry needed to make the 
relevant connections by the 1930s, they were not employed by anyone in the ecological literature 
until Hutchinson used Verdansky’s biochemical theory to develop accounts of  community and 
ecosystem mechanics after the publication of  Lindeman’s paper (see Hutchinson, 1979, p. 233).  So, 
while Lindeman certainly helped popularize the network-based view, his 1942 paper cannot be 
counted as the work that marks the beginning of  a new, modern, era in ecology, because he did not 
describe how ecological network-level dynamics may occur. 
Though Novikoff  (1945) also fails to provide a causal account of  how ecological network-
level properties are produced, he made a more significant stride in demystifying the holistic study of  
ecological networks than Lindeman, because, unlike Lindeman, Novikoff  explicitly discusses what 
the right metaphysics of  ecology should and should not entail.  Specifically, Novikoff  explains the 
network-based view and points out that it does not entail commitments to broadly ‘organicist’ 
metaphysical theses endorsed by earlier ecologists.  In essence, according to those organicist views 
Novikoff  rebuffs, nature is supposed to be comprised of  complex wholes whose constituent 
biological parts are unified, comprise an organic whole, by exhibiting behaviors that are coordinated to 
sustain vital processes of  the whole complex of  them (see, for example, Clements, 1916).  In other 
words, earlier, organicist, ecologists attributed irreducible causal properties to ecological networks.
 Novikoff  argues that there is a sensible holistic view that does not entail a commitment to 
the existence of  irreducible, “emergent,” causal properties of  the networks ecologists study.  He 
explains that this network-based view is still holistic in the sense of  taking account of  ecological 
network-level properties, but that it does not entail treating network-level properties as causal properties 
of  the networks themselves that are ontologically irreducible to series of  interactions between their 
constituent parts.  In his words:  
Each level of  organization possesses unique properties of  structure and behavior which, 
though dependent on the properties of  the constituent elements, appear only when these 
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elements are combined [to comprise networks]. Knowledge of  the laws of  the lower level is 
necessary for a full understanding of  the higher level; yet the unique properties of  
phenomena at the higher level cannot be predicted […] from the laws of  the lower level. 
(1945, p. 209)3 
Novikoff  claims that taking account of  “higher level” properties and regularities (“laws”) is necessary 
for understanding ecological networks—perhaps even an epistemic necessity.  However, he does not 
endorse the idea that ecological networks bear irreducible causal properties that are operative in 
coordinating the behaviors of  their component parts.  In fact, in his paper, Novikoff  only commits 
to the metaphysical claim that network-level properties are existentially dependent on those of  their 
“constituent elements,” and are “a consequence of  their [i.e., their parts’] properties” (ibid.).  
Notably, this claim is theory neutral in that it is compatible with both realism and antirealism, or 
“reductionism,” about individual ecological entities and with both realism and antirealism about 
ecological types. 
 Accordingly, Novikoff  (1945) argues that the network-based view is metaphysic-neutral.  As 
he explains it, the view: “neither reduces phenomena of  a higher level to those of  a lower one, as in 
mechanism, nor describes the higher level in vague non-material terms which are but substitutes for 
understanding, as in [organicism]” (p., 209).  The view does not “reduce phenomena of  a higher 
level,” in the sense that any actual network-level properties can only be seen by attempting to assess 
ecological networks as wholes.  In my view, this is for the simple reason that network-level 
properties are abstract ways of  characterizing complex series of  (direct and indirect) component-to-
component causal interactions between organisms (Donhauser, forthcoming).  Such properties 
cannot be seen by looking at organism-to-organism interactions, but only by “zooming-out,” so to 
speak, to the network level of  analysis.  The network-based view does not ‘describe the higher level 
in vague non-material terms,’ like organicist holisms, as Novikoff  says, because it does not entail 
                                                          
3 My ellipsis removes “a priori” from the quotation, as I believe it is unnecessary.  I note this because my deletion may 
change the content of this passage in ways unapparent to me. 
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commitment to any specific speculative views regarding the ontological reducibility or irreducibility 
of  ecological networks.  So again, the view is neutral regarding the (ir)reducibility of  ecological 
networks (or, if  you prefer, it’s agnostic regarding the reality of  causally operative network-level 
properties). 
As regards the legacy of  his paper, in it, Novikoff  explicitly endorsed the network-based 
view, and argued that any ecological network-level properties that may be found in nature can be 
best understood by studying both component-to-component interactions and ecological networks as 
wholes, whether or not ecological network-level properties are causally efficacious “over-and-above” 
the collective efficacy of  their constituent parts.  He thereby effectively instated the ontologically 
neutral, network-based, view as metaphysical foundation for modern ecology.  For this reason, I see 
Novikoff ’s 1945 paper as marking the beginning of  modern ecology.  However, I do not consider it 
the first work of  modern theoretical ecology.  This is because, although Novikoff  (1945) effectively 
ushered out antiquated organicist metaphysical views and instated the network-based metaphysical 
foundation for modern ecology, in his paper, he does nothing in the way of  engaging any methods 
characteristic of  theoretical ecological research. 
Indeed, as a rather short “white paper,” published for a general academic audience in Science, 
Novikoff  only makes the general points that I have just discussed and does not present any research 
findings or apply or develop any research methodologies.  It was not until Hutchinson (1948) that an 
ecologist clearly embraced the network-based view and also employed general methods used in 
theoretical ecology (cf. Slack, 2011).  Theoretical ecological research uses “theoretical principles, 
metaphorical analogies, and mathematical models” to produce and test explanatory and predictive 
hypotheses about “the assembly, structure, and emergent properties” of  population, community, and 
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ecosystem-level networks (Sagoff, 2003, p. 531).4  Hence, what gives Hutchinson (1948) all of  the 
hallmarks of  later theoretical work, and distinguishes the work from earlier, pre-modern, theoretical 
works, is the combination of  doing these things while embracing the network-based view. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the practice of  using mathematical models to 
characterize complex inter-organism phenomena began with Hutchinson (1948).  It is well known 
that this practice began earlier, with the development of  population models, like Lotka-Volterra 
models, in the 1920s and 30s.  Yet, in the substantive theoretical works pre-dating Hutchinson 
(1948), it is never suggested that entities like communities and ecosystems are causal networks to be 
found in nature.  As these earlier theoretical works were developed in a period of  backlash against 
earlier organicist conceptions of  ecological entities, their authors—most notably Lotka (1925), 
Volterra (1926), and Gause (1932)—adopted a more extreme view than the ontologically-neutral 
holism that appears in Novikoff  (1945) and Hutchinson (1948) (see Cooper, 2007, Ch. 2.3).  The 
authors of  these earlier theoretical works bought into variety of  dichotomous thinking that arose in 
the early 1900s, according to which ecologists had to either embrace organicist teleological 
metaphysics or altogether deny the existence of  ecological entities, and embrace a sort of  nihilism, 
in order to avoid the entailments of  organicism. 
Frederic Clements (1916) famously endorses the former view in speculating that each natural 
ecological community is a ‘supraorganism,’ or an “organic entity […that] arises, grows, matures, and 
dies” and has a “life-history” like an individual organism (p. 16).  Henry Gleason famously endorses 
the competing nihilistic view in The Individualistic Concept of  the Plant Association (1917).  Therein, he 
explicitly rejects Clements claims and argues that populations and communities are nothing but 
                                                          
4 I have replaced Sagoff’s use of ‘systems’ with ‘networks’ for two reasons.  First, ecologists do not always purport to 
investigate the properties of ecological systems, while ecological research does consist in the more general endeavor of 
studying ecological networks and their components.  Second, Sagoff uses ‘ecosystem’ to refer to ecological networks in 
general; rather than distinguishing populations, communities, and ecosystems as different sorts of ecological networks—
as I will to preserve substantive distinctions made within ecology. 
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contingent collections of  interacting organisms that continually change and do not exhibit any sort 
of  observable network-level structure or dynamics (see Gleason, 1917 and 1939; Odenbaugh, 2007).  
Those ecologists who developed the basic elements of  the theoretical approach to ecology that 
Hutchinson (1948) builds on followed Gleason. 
In fact, in their works that Hutchinson (1948) cites directly, populations, communities, and 
ecosystems are not ever described as naturally occurring causal networks.  In these works, 
‘population’ is used as a mass term that is elliptical for ‘individuals of  a species in a place’ and there 
is no mention of  ‘communities’ accept when referring to “human communities” (see Lotka, 1925).  
Accordingly, in the salient pre-modern theoretical works, there is no mention of  investigating natural 
‘ecosystems,’ and ‘system’ is used almost exclusively to refer to conceptual systems—as in “abstract 
systems of  description” or “systems of  equations” (Gause, 1932).5   
As I will explain more below, Hutchinson (1948) offers functional accounts of  the series of  
causal interactions through which biota and abiota can comprise ecological networks and produce 
dynamic patterns observable in aggregate data on relative population and nutrient abundances.  This 
doesn’t appear an especially noteworthy contribution to ecology on its own.  However, viewed in the 
historical context in which his work was introduced, one can see that by providing the salient 
accounts Hutchinson (1948) did two key things that solidified the network-based conceptual 
foundation for subsequent work in ecology and helped facilitate the subsequent development of  the 
theoretical branch of  ecology. 
First, he gave new life to ‘community’ and ‘ecosystem’ concepts by describing such things 
neither as living organic wholes nor as mere abstract constructs, but as naturally occurring causal 
                                                          
5 Lotka (1925) refers to “biological systems” in a few places and to “network[s] of relationships that connect […] closely 
living species” in one place (p. 137).  However, his overall project consists in re-conceptualizing biological phenomena in 
wholly physical terms, and using mathematical models from physics to simulate small population-scale phenomena (e.g., 
yeast populations) to test whether those equations can accurately predict what occurs in the selected populations.  
Although one could make the case that he held a metaphysic-neutral view, the standard interpretation of Lotka sees him 
as embracing a thoroughgoing antirealism according to which ecological entities are nothing-but theoretical machinery; see 
Kingsland (1995), p. 34. 
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networks resultant from series of  component-to-component interactions between organisms and 
inorganic materials.  By demonstrating how seeing communities and ecosystems in this way can 
facilitate better understanding of  the underlying mechanics of  observable trends in aggregated data, 
Hutchinson effectively led ecologists out of  the trenches of  metaphysical disputes about ecological 
entities and onto advancing knowledge about the workings of  natural ecological networks without 
getting bogged down in those deep metaphysical questions.6  Second, he gave credibility to 
theoretical approaches to ecological research by demonstrating, by example, how one can garner 
insights into the underlying mechanics of  emergent network-level dynamics through the application 
of  “theoretical principles, metaphorical analogies, and mathematical models.”7 
2. HUTCHINSON AND TELEOLOGICAL METAPHOR IN THEORETICAL ECOLOGY 
I progress in this section by first explaining in a bit more detail what Hutchinson does in his 
landmark paper, and then explaining the basic elements of  a reasoning process still commonly used 
in ecological research that he introduced therein.  As the use of  teleological metaphor is a key 
element in that reasoning process, I close the section by offering an operational analysis of  the 
instrumental role of  such metaphors in that process. 
Hutchinson (1948) basically uses teleological metaphors to help generate accounts of  the 
biophysical mechanics that could produce patterns observable in aggregate data of  different sorts.  
Specifically, he provides accounts of  the mechanics that could produce correlated dynamic patterns, 
what he calls “oscillations,” observable in data on nutrient resource and species abundances and data 
on the Earth’s biosphere.  Figure 1 (below) depicts the sort of  “observable oscillating” to which 
Hutchinson refers.  In this Figure I have also simulated the correlations between periodic changes in 
                                                          
6 This is not to say that ecologists stopped arguing about metaphysics; they still do.  It is to say that those ecologists who 
followed Hutchinson, and advanced the theoretical branch, were not preoccupied with these questions in their works. 
7 Hutchinson also helped the theoretical branch of ecology grow because his career spanned the period between the first 
wave of math-based analytical approaches (in the 1920’s) and the development of the methods used in theoretical 
ecological research (by the 1960’s); see Cooper (2007), Ch. 5; Fretwell (1975), p. 4; McIntosh (1985), pp. 275-9. 
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nutrient and population abundance levels that are typically seen in aggregated data on particular 
populations and nutrient resource levels for those populations. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Diagram of  Nutrient and Species Abundance Oscillations8 
To generate accounts of  the biophysical mechanics that could produce correlated patterns 
like these, Hutchinson (1948) imagines that the relevant patterns result from “self-regulatory” 
processes within ecological networks and then conceptually constructs a feasible series of  
component-to-component interactions through which the organisms (i.e. the nodes) in an ecological 
network could instantiate such processes (1948, p. 237).  In so doing, Hutchinson piloted the 
approach of  using teleological metaphors as a conceptual instrument—a constraining heuristic or 
“frame”—to aid in the production of  candidate accounts of  the underlying mechanics of  network-
level properties (cf. Peters, 1991, pp. 141-2). 
Then, as I understand him, Hutchinson treated ecological networks and the biosphere as if 
they were self-regulating wholes whose constitutive parts exhibit coordinated behaviors in order to 
conceptually reconstruct how observable “cyclical” dynamics may be produced in such networks.  
Unfortunately, Hutchinson does not explicitly say that this is what he is doing in his paper, and, as is 
the case with much of  the contemporary ecological literature, one must take care to disentangle 
                                                          
8 Figure 1 is not derived from a data set, and I’ve made up the values. Still, the figure accurately illustrates the sort of 
correlated dynamics between resources and species to which Hutchinson refers.  In fact, Figure 1 is very similar to data-
driven figures found in works that Hutchinson references; in which the authors report correlations between resource 
(e.g., nutrient or prey) abundances and population (e.g., plant or predator) abundances; see, for example, Volterra (1926), 
Figs. I and II and Volterra (1927), Fig. 7.  See also Clarke (1954), pp.396-9 and his Fig. 10.14. 
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metaphorical language from substantive descriptive claims to correctly understand his work.  Indeed, 
from the very start of  his paper one confronts confusing, half-metaphorical, language, as  
Hutchinson explains that his understanding of  ecological networks derives from mathematician 
Norbert Weiner’s “cybernetic theory,” according to which ‘it is usual to find various teleological 
mechanisms acting to damp oscillations’ within causal networks (p. 221).9 
Despite the commitments that this borrowed terminology may suggest, careful reading 
shows that Hutchinson conceives of  ‘teleological mechanisms’ in ecological networks as series of  
causal interactions that tend to keep the abundances of  organisms and their environmental 
resources from fluctuating too extremely.  In particular, he explains that such “mechanisms” are 
series of  species-typical interactions that tend to keep population and resource abundances within 
ranges of  fluctuation that allow multi-population, community-scale, ecological networks to persist—
by maintaining an overall organism-to-resource balance that enables their constituent populations to 
persist.  So, according to Hutchinson, teleological mechanisms in ecological networks act like a 
thermostat in a heating system in a certain sense, in that they serve to keep such networks from 
changing so drastically they collapse (cf. Odum, 1959, p. 45).  Still, the mechanical picture he 
presents is not one in which the behaviors of  the component parts of  ecological networks are 
somehow coordinated by an overall network control like a thermostat.  To the contrary, he maintains 
that periodic cycles in nutrient and population abundances result from species-typical component-
to-component interactions that can be usefully described both bio-geo-chemically (“in terms of  the 
transfer of  some substance through [a network]”) and bio-demographically (“in terms of  the 
variations in the numbers of  biological units or individuals”) (1948, p. 221). 
                                                          
9 Hutchinson and Weiner were among several prominent figures to participate in the Josiah Macy “Feedback 
Conferences” in New York in the late 1940s; see Slack (2011), pp. 236-7.  Weiner’s hugely influential book Cybernetics, or 
Control and Communication in the Animal and Machine was also published in 1948—in the wake of that event.  Notably, in it, 
Weiner explicitly abandons earlier teleological conceptions of physical systems; Evelyn Fox Keller (2008) provides an 
illuminating historiography of the abandonment of teleological thinking in science at this time. 
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Accordingly, in the first half  of  the paper, Hutchinson offers straightforward “bottom-up” 
accounts of  series of  typical biophysical interactions that he proposes produce carbon-cycling in the 
biosphere and of  series of  typical interactions that he proposes produce nutrient-cycling through 
ecological networks.  He then argues that these series of  typical component-to-component 
interactions are the “mechanisms” that jointly produce observable correlated changes and 
oscillations in nutrient and population abundances (1948, pp. 222-36).  The latter part of  his paper 
then concentrates on explaining how some theoretical population models (Lotka-Volterra model 
variations) can be used to predict relative rates of  change in the abundances of  certain sorts of  
interacting populations (e.g., predator and prey).  And Hutchinson closes the paper by outlining how 
such models might be combined to generate useful community-scale models (1948, pp. 238-42). 
For the purposes at hand, it is instructive to now turn to clarifying how teleological 
characterizations help ecologists better understand ecological phenomena.  As I have said, I will do 
this by offering an account of  the heuristic role that teleological metaphors play in the reasoning 
process that Hutchinson employed in his project and that ecologists commonly employ to date.  
That role of  teleological metaphors in reasoning in ecology is brought into focus by looking at the 
role such metaphors play in sciences other than ecology. 
Consider, for example, geophysicists descriptions of  how riverbed structure typically evolves 
due to erosion from water flow as a bed’s sediment material organizing so as to minimize the energy 
available to deform it by introducing resistance to flow (see, for instance, Eaton et al, 2006; Church et al, 
1998).  As another example, consider chemists descriptions of  atoms of  different types 
electrostatically attracting and repelling each other or their characterizations of  the behaviors of  
aggregates of  atoms in general as such aggregates always seeking “energetically favorable” 
combinations.  Characterizations like these are to be interpreted metaphorically, because although 
they look as if  they explain why the behaviors they are used to characterize occur prima facie, that 
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information is not provided by such characterizations.  Geophysicists are not saying that the 
sediment comprising a riverbed does not organize as it does because that sediment particle network 
has a goal to resist erosive forces.  Likewise, chemists do not claim that aggregates of  atoms 
organize as they do because they literally intentionally seek stable combinations.  The teleological 
component of  such characterizations is neither literal nor explanatory. 
Rather, I submit that such metaphors aid in the process of  understanding phenomena that 
are somewhat difficult to grasp by allowing them to be seen as similar to phenomena that are 
comparatively more familiar and therefore easier to understand.  Accordingly, I submit that 
teleologically-charged notions like ‘resistance,’ ‘attraction,’ ‘chasing,’ and ‘organizing’ are useful 
metaphors because they help characterize the flow of  causal processes that are relatively difficult to 
understand, and thereby aid scientists in generating causal accounts of  how network-level dynamics 
occur.  To illustrate how such metaphors do this, consider the following description of  how salt (a 
network of  sodium and chlorine atoms) dissolves in water presented by Marc Lange.  Lange says: 
The crystal lattice of  sodium chloride [salt] is held together by very strong electrostatic 
attractions between alternating positively charged (sodium) and negative charged (chlorine) 
ions. In water, crystalline sodium chloride dissolves into individual sodium and chloride ions 
because the attraction between Na and Cl is greatly exceeded by the electrostatic attraction 
between Na and the partially negatively charged oxygen atom of  a water molecule, and 
between Cl and one of  the positively charged hydrogen atoms of  the water molecule. Water 
molecules are therefore able to insert themselves between these ions; the energy needed to 
separate a Na atom from a Cl atom is more than provided by the energy released when 
bonds form between water molecules and these ions.  (1994, p. 115) 
In this passage, the teleological phrases indicate how, not why, the nodes in such atomic 
networks behave as they do.  They are metaphorical, not unlike describing how individual clouds 
behave relative to one another by saying they “chase each other” or “dance together” across the sky 
(Nissen, 1983, p. 155).  By helping one envision how the atoms comprising salt and water behave 
relative to one another to produce salt’s dissolution, the metaphorical elements of  characterizations 
like Lange’s aid one, heuristically, in formulating a conceptual picture of  the mechanics of  how salt 
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dissolves in water.  I submit that Hutchinson’s “teleological mechanisms,” and more common talk of  
“self-regulation” and “self-organization” in ecology, also serve as heuristically useful metaphors, by 
outlining, in a cursory way, how the nodes in ecological networks must behave relative to each other 
to produce observable network-level properties.  
In my view, Hutchinson’s “teleological,” “self-regulatory,” mechanisms that “dampen 
oscillations” in population and nutrient abundances, are metaphors that helped him generate the 
component-to-component accounts of  the series of  interactions that could plausibly produce the 
observable correlated oscillations he sought to explain.  Just as seeing atoms as attracting each other 
or clouds as chasing each other can be helpful, metaphors like ‘self-regulation’ are helpful by limiting 
the possibilities concerning what may serve as a plausible component-to-component account 
capable of  explaining away the teleological content of  such characterizations.  Accordingly, these 
metaphors appear to serve constraining, heuristic, roles in Hutchinson’s project by dictating that a 
plausible account of  the underlying mechanics of  observable oscillations in nutrient and population 
abundances must have organisms and their resource materials, the nodes in the networks that 
produce those oscillations, behaving in ways whereby they could collectively produce such patterned 
network-level dynamics.  By providing accounts that fit this bill—his “biochemical” and 
“biodemographic” explanations of  how observable oscillations in nutrient and population 
abundances are produced—Hutchinson (1948) effectively provides a way to explain away the 
teleological content of  the metaphors he employs.  His project at once shows how envisioning 
ecological networks as if they are self-regulating systems can help advance understanding of  the 
inner workings of  such networks, and exemplifies a general process of  reasoning with teleological 
metaphors that is still commonly employed in ecological research. 
3. ECOLOGY AS ETIOLOGICAL, NOT TELEOLOGICAL, IN ITS METAPHYSICS 
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There has been a historied debate about whether ecology is ultimately undergirded by a teleological 
metaphysics in ecology and the philosophy thereof  (de Laplante & Picasso, 2011 provide a nice 
overview).  For different reasons, some continue to urge that teleological characterizations of  
ecological phenomena are either best understood literally or somehow rely on unshakable 
teleological metaphysical commitments (see, for example, Goldsmith, 2008; Jax et al., 1998; Shrader-
Frechette, 1986; Voûte 1968; Worster 1990; Sagoff  2013).  And, as I have said, some ecologists do in 
fact appear to wholeheartedly endorse robust teleological views.  Though it is usually hard to tell 
how seriously committed individual ecologists may be, it is undeniable that ostensible commitments 
to teleological views are preserved through continued use of  descriptions of  natural ecosystems as 
exhibiting “self-organizing” tendencies and “top-down control” constraints that are said to partially 
determine the properties of  their component parts (e.g., organism behaviors and traits) (see Sole & 
Bascompte 2006).  There are also enduring criticisms of  ecology that engage a literalist construal of  
ecologists’ teleological characterizations. 
 Numerous critiques presume that ecologists generally embrace a sort of  “naïve positivism” 
and purport to provide literal characterizations of  natural kinds of  ecological phenomena (Shrader-
Frechette & McCoy, 1993, p. 149; cf. Peters 1991, Ch. 5; Sagoff, 2003, p. 532; Simberloff, 1980, pp. 
23-5).  Certain, more specific, critiques engage a literalist interpretation according to which a 
wellspring of  alleged problems for ecologists is that they cannot “find a source for the teleology that 
[allegedly] underwrites [their] functional accounts” of  ecological phenomena (Cooper, 2007, p. 282).  
For example, lauded environmental philosopher Mark Sagoff  employs a literalist interpretation of  
teleological characterizations to found arguments according to which theoretical ecological research 
is supposed to be unscientific and of  no use practical decision-making (see Sagoff  1997; 2000; 
2013).   For instance, in a recent popular article, he contends that much work in ecology is 
unscientific because modern ecologists still rely on some form of  Clementian organicism (discussed 
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above in §1).10  Specifically, Sagoff  alleges that ecologists rely on the claim that properties of  
ecological networks and their component parts are caused by some essential network-level telos or 
‘directed self-organizing capabilities.’  And he argues that because there is, in his words, “magical 
thinking behind the idea that ecosystems are […self-organizing] systems,” ecologists cannot 
empirically substantiate that theories and models that characterize natural ecosystems are useful for 
characterizing any particular things in nature (Sagoff, 2013, p. 248 see also Sagoff, 1997, pp. 960-3, 
891-3).   
While I agree that there is no reason to think that ecological networks have properties that 
coordinate the behaviors of  their component parts, I believe most modern ecologists would agree as 
well and submit that literalist construals of  most teleological characterizations found in modern 
ecological research are misguided.  I have lent credence to this claim already by recounting how 
ecologists traded robust ontological positions for an ontology-neutral one, according to which 
population, communities, and ecosystems, are simply causal networks resulting from contingent 
species-typical interactions, by the mid-1940s.  I’ve also challenged the idea that modern ecologists 
rely on teleological metaphysics by arguing that Hutchinson did not do this even in the first, and in 
important ways archetypical, project in modern theoretical ecology; as well as by further arguing that 
ecologists routinely use teleological metaphors to aid in generating component-to-component 
accounts of  the mechanics of  ecological network-level dynamics following Hutchinson. 
Since my story so far leaves off  in 1948, with Hutchinson’s project, one might well retort 
that ecologists could have systematically misinterpreted Hutchinson since the 1950s, forgotten about 
his metaphorical usage of  teleological characterizations, or just plain reclaimed the robust 
teleological thinking of  earlier ecologists.  Notably, however, there is textual evidence showing that 
                                                          
10 I say that Sagoff’s 2013 target article is “popular” on the grounds that it is listed as the “most read” article on the 
publishers main page (with over two-thousand reported views) and is cited in numerous independent published works. 
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this apparently did not occur, and that, in general, ecologists have stayed on board with the idea that 
teleological characterizations of  ecological phenomena are non-literal. 
For one thing, the literature shows contemporary ecologists typically identifying bona fide 
teleological causes only at the level of  individual organisms.  Specifically, it shows that they appear to 
see such causes playing an operative role in bringing about ecological network-level properties only 
via the intentional reproductive and survival behaviors of  individual organisms (cf. Irwin 2015, pp. 
317-8; cf. McShea 2012).  Since the most basic causally operative nodes in the networks they study 
are organisms, ecologists naturally take note of  teleological causes when taking account of  certain 
behaviors of  particular organism(s).  For instance, a wolf  has a goal that determines its behavior 
when it preys upon deer, and explanations or predictions that account for individual wolf  behaviors, 
or even pack behaviors, may therefore in some sense take account of  the causal impacts of  such 
goals.  Yet, acknowledging that any organism may contribute to a series of  ecological interactions 
that influence population, community, or ecosystem-level dynamics with some of  its goal-directed 
behaviors in no way implies that the behaviors of  individual organisms are also coordinated by some 
telos belonging to the ecological networks in which they are nodes (see Peacock, 2011, p. 235).  
Accordingly, I think most ecologists would agree that teleological causes are apparently operative 
only at the organism level of  analysis (where one finds individuals with intentions).  As Peter 
Richerson says: 
Natural selection is the most basic ecological process because it appears to be the only 
mechanism directly responsible for goal-directed behavior on the part of  biological 
organisms. In the past, ecologists have often carelessly attributed goal-seeking behavior to 
various levels of  organization in what might now be characterized as ‘fallacies of  misplaced 
teleology.’  (1977, p. 3) 
The literature also shows that ecologists have tended to shy away from committing to any 
robust metaphysics at all.  Numerous ecologists have defended antirealist positions, and numerous 
authors argue that a thoroughgoing antirealism has been the prevailing paradigm within ecology for 
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several decades (see Botkin 1990; Fitzsimmons 1999; Wittbecker 1990).  More generally, ecologists 
have shifted away from reifying descriptions of  populations, communities, and ecosystems in the 
contemporary literature, toward talk of  abstract ‘levels of  analysis.’  In line with this shift, one often 
finds descriptions of  ecological research as consisting in doing “network analyses” and investigating 
“network pathways,” or series of  stochastic interactions between organisms and aspects of  their 
environment(s), that produce patterns observable at different network-levels of  analysis (see Allesina 
& Bondavalli, 2004; Donhauser, forthcoming; Patten, 2010; Scharler et al, 2005; Ulanowicz, 2011).  
Prima facie robust teleological characterizations like the ‘interconnection of  everything to everything 
else’ and ‘self-organization’ are considered accordingly as, “semantic constructs for describing the 
subtle and yet complex nature of  eco[logical networks]” (Gattie et al, 2006, p. 162; see also the 
sources cited therein).  In other words, such characterizations are typically seen as useful ways of  
describing dynamic trends and patterns seen from a zoomed out, network-level, perspective—or ways 
of  outlining “very general events [that] are only seen […] with rather blurred vision” as Robert 
MacArthur once said (1968, p. 159). 
While much loose teleological language is undoubtedly very common in the ecological 
literature, one simply does not find evidence of  a general shift back to serious commitments to a 
robust teleology.  The burden is therefore on those who claim that modern ecologists’ rely on 
teleological metaphysics, or any sort of  “magical thinking,” to provide anything but misinterpreted 
metaphors to uphold their critiques.  To do a bit more than just offloading the burden of  proof, I 
will now show that ecologists needn’t rely on such commitments by outlining a viable deflationary, 
etiological and instrumentalist, view available to them.  More specifically, I will finish out this section 
by sketching three lines of  argument ecologists can use to defuse claims that their teleological 
characterizations commit them to a teleological metaphysics. 
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My primary suggestion is that they can defuse such claims by explicitly embracing what I call 
an ‘etiological’ view of  teleology.  As I said in the introduction, this etiological view sees teleological 
characterizations as shorthand ways of  describing the component-to-component underlying causes of  
ecological network-level properties.  Whereas the robust teleological metaphysics some mistakenly 
attribute to ecologists assumes that some properties of  ecological network’s and their component 
part’s are caused, “top-down,” by a network’s tendency to evolve toward some future state, an 
etiological metaphysics assumes that all properties are caused by component-to-component, 
“bottom-up,” interactions.  This view, which I believe is in fact generally received by modern 
ecologists, then effectively reduces teleological explanations to efficient causal explanations; in stark 
contrast to a teleological metaphysics that counts teleological explanations as genuine causal 
explanations that are somehow irreducible to efficient causal explanations.11 
More specifically, I submit that teleological characterizations reduce to the following form 
according to the etiological understanding I am endorsing.  They say that for any instance of  some 
type of  ecological network, N: ‘any N has the function of  doing P just in case an N is present as a 
result of  causing P’ (cf. Papineau, 1992, pp. 61-7; Wright, 1976, Ch. 3).  Consider, for example, the 
characterization according to which an ecosystem is ‘an ecological network that functions to 
maximize energy available for work within its boundaries to the extent permitted by energy inputs to 
that network’ (see Mitsch & Jørgensen, 2004, p. 92; Zhang et al., 2010, p. 695).  This is to say that an 
ecosystem is present just in case an ecological network is functioning as such, and that that 
ecosystem persists just as long as that network continues to function that way.  This etiological way 
of  interpreting teleological characterizations of  ecosystems does not require that one refer to any 
                                                          
11 The endorsed etiological view, which sees teleological claims as metaphorical characterizations of  component-to-
component causal processes, also appears to stand as an alternative to views that attempt to “naturalize” claims about 
teleological functions.  Views of  this later sort essentially claim that biological entities exhibit certain properties because 
they have “traits” (some type of  composition) that has been designed for realizing said properties by evolutionary 
processes; see Bedau (1991) for discussion.  I mention this to block confusions that may be triggered by my use of  
‘etiological,’ which appears in the philosophical literature on “naturalizing teleological functions.” 
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teleological cause of  the dynamics of  any such networks.  Rather, it sees the characterization 
according to which ‘ecosystems function to maximize exergy’ as telling one what an ecological 
network will do if  it qualifies as an ecosystem, not why or how it may do it. 
According to this etiological understanding, to say that a particular ecological network is an 
ecosystem because it exhibits exergy-maximizing dynamics is not to say that this fact explains why or 
how said network does so.  It is just to say that the component parts of  that network are, for the 
duration of  that time they constitute an ecosystem, exhibiting patterns of  behavior relative to each 
other such that they effectively maximize exergy within the boundaries of  that network (whyever, 
however, and for whatever period of  time they do so) (cf. Patten & Odum, 1981, p. 889).  Explicitly 
endorsing this etiological understanding of  teleological characterizations, which I submit is at work 
in the background of  contemporary work in ecology, would go a long way toward defusing 
allegations that ecologists still harbor commitments to antiquated teleological views. 
Another way ecologists can effectively undermine claims that they embrace a teleological 
metaphysics is by more consistently noting that the “mechanisms” that produce ecological network-
level dynamics are identical to those operative in processes of  natural selection.  For example, it 
should be made clearer in the literature in ecology that processes of  natural selection produce 
changes in the composition of  ecological networks such that they exhibit network-level dynamics 
whose trajectories are aptly outlined with certain teleological characterizations.  Consider, for 
instance, how processes of  natural selection might change the composition of  a community 
comprised of  different plant species.  A species, X, suited to growing well given an abundant supply 
of  certain nutrients will do so and will therefore out-compete other species that are less well suited 
to growing in those same conditions.  Accordingly, if  relative nutrient resource abundances change 
substantially, species-X would likely be supplanted by a species, Y, that is better suited to thriving in 
the new conditions.  In this way, at least some community-scale plant networks do in fact “maximize 
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useable energy” within their boundaries through processes whereby the most fit species always win 
the day—such that these communities always produce what can be described as an “optimal” 
amount of  biomass by changing in their overall composition in response to changing network 
inputs.  So, it just makes sense that the dynamics of  any such network will be aptly characterized by 
saying that that network will exhibit compositional and structural changes in such a way that it will 
tend to maximize useable energy within its boundaries to the extent permitted by environmental 
constraints.12  Clearly explaining such things in the ecological literature would, in the very least, serve 
to make it clearer that ecologists’ teleological characterizations are non-literal, and non-causal, and 
can be re-cast in component-to-component terms. 
Finally, and perhaps obviously, ecologists can also undermine claims that they embrace a 
teleological metaphysics by explicitly committing to an ‘instrumentalist’ epistemology, according to 
which characterizations of  ecological phenomena are essentially conceptual instruments whose value 
primarily depends on whether (and how well) they aid in understanding and predicting things about 
natural phenomena—regardless of  whether they are true.  This is not to suggest that commitment 
to an instrumentalist epistemology is implied by committing to the view that teleological 
characterizations are metaphorical.  Indeed, one can maintain that characterizations of  ecological 
networks are metaphorical and consistently maintain that they also, at least partially, accurately 
describe natural phenomena.  My point is simply that instrumentalism is a tenable epistemology 
available to ecologists that is neutral with respect to matters of  metaphysics.  Hence, ecologists can 
also deflect claims that their teleological characterizations are literal by explicitly embracing a form 
of  instrumentalism. 
Worse for those who claim ecologists embrace any sort of  robust metaphysics, as a matter 
of  fact, instrumentalism appears to be the working epistemology of  very many projects in ecology.  
                                                          
12 One should also expect observable population abundance “oscillations” (as shown in Figure 1 above) in ecological 
networks in which nutrient levels change in periodic cycles (due to seasonal weather conditions, for instance). 
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The express purpose of  a large number of  archetypal theoretical projects in ecology is developing 
maximally simplistic and predictively powerful principles and models—without concern for whether 
those, often patently false models, accurately represent things as they are in nature (Donhauser, 
2014; see also, Levins, 1966 and Odenbaugh, 2005).  And since much current work in ecology aims 
to address environmental problems, is therefore solution-oriented and pragmatically driven, and 
increasingly “occurs in a volatile juncture between science and politics,” one should expect that 
ecologists would naturally embrace broadly instrumentalist views (Odenbaugh, 2010, p. 155).  For 
that matter, many would urge that ecological research is not, and perhaps has never been, geared 
toward developing literally true theories and models at all.  In fact, numerous authors contend that 
the entire enterprise of  ecology is best understood as an endless pragmatic effort to: posit new 
hypotheses that become relevant to public policy and resource management as the environment 
continually changes; anticipate novel environmental problems; and explore the potential 
ramifications of  alternative responses to potential problems (cf. Holling, 1995, p. 4; Mitchell 2009, p. 
99; Rist et al, 2013). 
4.  CONCLUSION 
I have sought to push forward the philosophical and broader crossdisciplinary dialogue about 
ecology’s scientific and practical value by clearing away some persisting confusions about the 
science’s philosophical foundations.  To take stock, I have done this by:  
 tracking early ecologists’ shift away from teleological metaphysics, and explaining the conceptual 
innovations that marked the beginning of  modern theoretical ecology; 
 offering an operational account of  the heuristic role of  teleological metaphors in certain general 
reasoning processes employed in theoretical ecological research (after Hutchinson 1948); 
 challenging enduring literalist construals of  teleological characterizations employed in ecology; 
 and showing that ecologists needn’t rely on robust teleological commitments by outlining 
etiological and instrumentalist views as viable alternatives. 
  27 
 Of  course, I have left much undone, and there remains much work to be done to glean 
further insights into ecology’s foundations, inferential methods, and value.  For example, though I 
have limited my attention to examining how we should understand teleological language in ecology, I 
believe the etiological view that I have outlined bears significant implications for concerns about 
ecologist’s delineations of  natural kinds of  ecological phenomena.  There is also interesting 
philosophical work to do on the implications of  ecological research for general metaphysics and 
epistemology of  science; as well as important practical work to do on clarifying applications of  
various ecological research methods for policy and resource management decision-making.  It is my 
sincere hope that my arguments in this essay will inspire further work on ecology, and that others 
interested in ecology and its applications find resources in it to extend their own investigations. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Diagram of  Nutrient and Species Abundance Oscillations13 
                                                          
13 Figure 1 is not derived from a data set, and I’ve made up the values. Still, the figure accurately illustrates the sort of 
correlated dynamics between resources and species to which Hutchinson refers.  In fact, the figure is similar to data-
driven figures found in works that Hutchinson references; in which the authors report correlations between resource 
(e.g., nutrient or prey) abundances and population (e.g., plant or predator) abundances; see, for example, Volterra 1926 
(Figs. I and II) and Volterra 1927 (Fig. 7).  See also Clarke 1954, 396-9 and his Fig. 10.14. 
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